The Geneva Commission on a Multilateral Air Transport Agreement by McClurkin, Robert J. G.
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 15 | Issue 1 Article 4
1948
The Geneva Commission on a Multilateral Air
Transport Agreement
Robert J. G. McClurkin
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and
Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert J. G. McClurkin, The Geneva Commission on a Multilateral Air Transport Agreement, 15 J. Air L. & Com. 39 (1948)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol15/iss1/4
THE GENEVA COMMISSION ON A
MULTILATERAL AIR TRANSPORT
AGREEMENT
By ROBERT J. G. MCCLURKIN
Assistant Director (International), Economic Bureau, Civil Aero-
nautics Board; Adviser to the United States Delegation to the Ge-
neva Conference; University of Pittsburgh, A.B. 1931, M.A. 1932.
F OR more than three years there have been efforts to develop a
generally acceptable multilateral treaty concerning the exchange
of commercial rights in international civil air transport. The Chicago
Conference produced the Air Transport Agreement, which was ratified
by only 17 states, of which four, including the United States, have now
withdrawn or given notice of withdrawal. Recognizing that the Air
Transport Agreement lacked general acceptability, the nations that
were members of the PICAO attempted unsuccessfully at the Interim
Assembly of the Organization in 1946 to find a common basis for
agreement. Discussion continued at the First Assembly of the perma-
nent Organization in May 1947 at Montreal.' Again no area of gen-
eral agreement was reached; but the discussion had probed more deeply
than ever before into the basic issues, and it seemed that a concentrated
effort apart from the Assembly where delegates had to occupy them-
selves with many other subjects might bear fruit.2 The Assembly there-
fore formally resolved to convene "a commission, open to all Member
States ... for the purpose of developing and submitting for considera-
tion of Member States an agreement respecting the exchange of com-
mercial rights in international civil air transport."
The Commission met at Geneva from November 4 through No-
vember 27, 1947. Represented with duly authorized delegations were
30 nations.3 The United States Delegation to the Commission had
as its Chairman Garrison Norton, Assistant Secretary of State.4
1 See, Cooper, "The Proposed Multilateral Agreement on Commercial Rights
in International Civil Air Transport," 14 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW & COMMERCE 125
(1947).2 See report on the First Assembly, 14 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW & COMMERCE
378, 381 (1947).
s Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Czecho-
slovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Greece,
India, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway,
Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom,
United States, Venezuela. Representatives of Guatemala, Luxembourg, and
Poland attended as observers.
4 Vice Chairman of the Delegation was Oswald Ryan, Vice Chairman of the
CAB. The U.S. Delegation also included Senator Owen Brewster, Congressmen
Alfred L. Bulwinkle and Carl Hinshaw, Russell B. Adams, Livingston T. Mer-
chant, Stuart G. Tipton, Paul T. David, John C. Cooper, and Robert J. G. Mc-
Clurkin. As observers with the Delegation were a representative of the Army
Air Forces, the U.S. Civil Air Attaches stationed in Europe, and representatives
of several of the United States international air lines.
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The discussion at the conference ranged over the same major topics
as had previous conferences on this subject:
1. The method of determining what rates may be charged in
international air transportation.
.2. The procedure for settling any disputes which might arise
over the interpretation or application of the agreement.
3. The method by which nations would grant or exchange
the rights to operate on specific routes.
4. The general principles governing the capacity which an
air line may provide on an international route.
Each of these topics had been extensively discussed in the course of
all of the previous efforts to reach a multilateral agreement, but the
Geneva Commission went further than ever before in a full interna-
tional conference in that it proceeded to actual drafting. The close
and detailed discussion engendered by the attempts to put the flesh of
language upon the skeleton of ideas brought the Commission to a real
understanding of the issues and of the underlying problems created by
national attitudes and policies.
Working Groups, insofar as possible reflecting the differing opin-
ions at the Commission, produced a capacity article and a rate article
which were later refined in the fire of discussion by the full Commis-
sion. The close drafting process was further advanced by the forma-
tion on November 13 of a Drafting Committee5 which further sharp-
ened the language of the capacity article, the disputes provision, and
the general principles governing route exchanges. In addition it la-
bored with the final provisions and with the important preliminary
provisions defining- the relationship of the multilateral agreement to
other agreements concerning air transportation. The draft articles
produced by this committee and by the Working Groups, in the main
under the general guidance of preliminary discussion in full Commis-
sion, assuredly represent an advance toward clarity, and even toward
general agreement, over any prikr document. As they stand in Annex
III to the Final Report of the conference they will undoubtedly serve
as the best basis for any future discussion of a multilateral air transport
agreement.0
This penetration through generalities to what people really meant
and the efforts to find the precise words for those meanings constituted
the real achievement of the Commission. They gave the Commission
the. feeling which persisted throughout the first two and a half weeks
that progress was being made toward an agreement. However, they
were also responsible finally for the widening cleavage which resulted
in the failure to reach an agreement.
5 The Committee was composed of representatives of Argentina, Belgium,
Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, France, the Netherlands, Mexico, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.
6 The Final Report of the Commission, including Annex III, is set forth in
this issue on page 92.
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It should be pointed out that the progress being made in the close
drafting process was not being made by means of final and irrevocable
decisions. As issues arose, they were settled only tentatively. The
general attitude was to agree to take a given step for the moment, but
to reserve the right to look at the agreement as a whole before making
a final determination. So the conference proceeded by a series of
hypotheses - tentative decisions on the basis of which the Commission
could advance to other related subjects. Such decisions were made,
for example, with respect to basing the agreement upon bilateral route
exchanges rather than upon a multilateral exchange, confining the
agreement to the rights and obligations connected with the carriage of
traffic rather than attempting to include the rights of transit and tech-
nical stop, and. attempting to prepare a document in a form which
could be opened for signature at the end of the conference. The tech-
nique was useful in getting ahead despite the objections of small groups
of states on particular points, but it left an accumulation of unresolved
issues which had to be faced in the closing days of the Commission,
and it was the attempt to resolve one of these issues which was the im-
mediate cause of the breakdown of the conference.
Even though the Commission failed to produce a multilateral agree-
ment which could be opened for signature, it is of some importance
to summarize the course of discussion on the major issues. Commercial
airplanes will continue to fly internationally under bilateral arrange-
ments of various sorts, and the trends of national thinking evidenced
at Geneva have significant implications for those bilateral agreements
as well as for any future efforts to reach a multilateral agreement in
this field.
ELIMINATION OF BURDENS UPON INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES
While this was not one of the major issues of the Commission, it is a
matter of considerable concern to all air lines which operate interna-
tionally. The United States had presented five articles on this subject
at the time of the consideration of the multilateral agreement at the
First Assembly of ICAO and the United States Delegation to the Com-
mission introduced the same articles at Geneva.7 They cover the im-
portation of ground equipment and supplies by an air line into a coun-
try other than its own, the relieving of all such supplies from laws of
foreign states allowing their requisitioning for public use, the right
of an air line to bring a reasonable number of supervisory and technical
employees into any country into which it operates, the elimination of
requirements for duplicate insurance, and the taking of measures to-
ward the elimination of double taxation.
In his speech to the Commission Sir William Hildred, the Director
General of IATA, laid particular stress upon the importance of these
United States proposals and urged strongly that the Commission act
favorably upon them. However, his recommendations bore no fruit.
7 See Annex IV to Final Report of the Commission, page 106.
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Some delegations maintained that they were without authority to deal
with these problems which necessarily involved other departments of
their own governments. Other delegations held that they were not
appropriate subjects for inclusion in the multilateral agreement.
Having become convinced that there was no hope of securing Com-
mission consent for these articles, the United States withdrew them,
whereupon the Commission resolved "that such provisions were not
suitable for inclusion in an agreement of the type under considera-
tion, but... that they should be referred to the ICAO for further study
and discussion at the next Annual Assembly." It is expected that the
Second Assembly will give consideration of steps which might be taken
toward the easing or elimination of these burdens upon international
air lines.
RATES
There have always been two principal approaches to this problem,
differing chiefly in the extent to which the method of rate-setting is
spelled out. One approach has been to specify simply that rates shall
be reasonable, to mention certain criteria which among others shall
be considered in determining the reasonableness of an individual rate,
and to allow any problems which arise to be worked out through the
normal channels of consultation and the disputes procedure. Although
there was some sentiment at Geneva in favor of this approach, it
quickly became evident that this sentiment was much outweighed by
a more widespread belief that it was essential to write a much more
detailed provision in order to avert any possibility of costly and debili-
tating rate wars in international air transportation. Consequently, the
Commission addressed itself to the task of writing such a provision.
At bottom there turned out to be only one major difference of
opinion. There was general agreement that rates might be set by con-
ferences of air lines, that they should be subject to the approval of the
governments concerned, that individual governments should have the
power to initiate action to revise rates, and that any disagreements
should be resolved through consultation if possible and through the
disputes procedure if consultation failed.
However, some of the nations which have operated most exten-
sively in the international field, the United States among them, felt an
imperative necessity for avoiding a situation in which the introduction
of a new rate could be postponed virtually indefinitely while one or a
few dissenting nations invoked the procedures for consultation and
arbitration - procedures which conceivably might involve considerable
time. In consequence they proposed a provision that in case of dis-
agreement over a proposed new rate it could be introduced 180 days
after the opening step in the consultation procedure, pending the
eventual decision as to the reasonableness of the rate. This proposal
aroused strenuous opposition from a number of countries which argued
vigorously that it is against their national policy to allow any rate in-
volving their territory to go into effect without their prior approval.
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On this point a special Working Group composed of Argentina, France,
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States succeeded in
reaching a compromise. As the article was redrawn it seis time limits
within which consultation must occur and within which any disagree-
ment remaining after consultation must be submitted to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, then provides that the Court may make a
binding interim provision of "measures which ought to be taken to
preserve the rights of the parties."
DISPUTES
The discussion of all other portions of the agreement was tempered
by the realization that it would be acceptable to few nations unless
adequate means were provided for the settlement of disputes; for it
was generally recognized that in any field so new, so competitive, and
so rapidly expanding as international air transportation disputes of
grave importance would almost inevitably arise.
In a number of individual cases the United States has agreed to the
binding settlement of particular disputes on an ad hoc basis; and of
course the United States by action of the Senate has accepted the com-
pulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. When the
formal discussion of the disputes article was reached, the United States
therefore introduced a brief draft article providing for the use of the
International Court under Article 36 (2) of the Statute of the Court,
or in the alternative, upon the specific agreement of both parties, for
the use of ad hoc arbitral tribunals. The United Kingdom proposed
two additions. The first one provided for a binding modus vivendi
pending the settlement of a dispute, the second for the creation of
panels 'of jurists and technical experts from which arbitral tribunals
would be selected. These suggestions together with the original United
States proposal were then referred to the Drafting Committee, which
drew up what now appears as Article 21 of Annex III to the Final
Report of the Commission.
Considering the importance of the subject, the discussion had not
been lengthy, and much of it had centered around what was really a
side issue - the problem created by the fact that neither Ireland nor
Portugal has accepted the jurisdiction of the International Court.
ROUTES
Earlier considerations of the multilateral agreement had devoted
much time to long debate over the method of route exchanges. One
group of nations had insisted that anything short of a multilateral
exchange of the right to operate would be a backward step and there-
fore unacceptable to them. Their proposals of course included spe-
cific provisions defining the limits of the rights exchanged, but it was
intended that nothing should be left to bilateral negotiations. A sec-
ond, and growing, group of nations had contended that it is not prac-
tical in the present state of international aviation to attempt anything
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so far-reaching, and that the exchange of routes must therefore be left
to separate bilateral negotiations.
At the opening of the discussion of this subject at Geneva, Canada
proposed as a compromise solution that the agreement provide for an
automatic exchange of the right to operate Third and Fourth Freedom
services, but that Fifth Freedom rights be left entirely to bilateral
negotiation." Although there was some support for this proposal, the
majority sentiment was clearly opposed to it: The United States and a
number of other nations stated their unqualified insistence upon com-
plete freedom for the separate bilateral negotiation of routes, with no
obligation of any kind being imposed upon any nation to agree to
grant a route to another nation. Route exchanges, that is, were not to
be justiciable matters.
With only one dissenting vote the Commission finally decided to
proceed with the drafting of the agreement upon the hypothesis that
it would be based upon this viewpoint.
CAPACITY
This subject is the economic heartland of the multilateral agree-
ment, since it involves the vital question of the number of passenger
seats and the amount of mail and cargo space which an air line will be
allowed to operate along its international routes. Actually, in the
course of the last three years, there has been a progressive narrowing
of the area of difference. While unanimity of opinion has not been
reached, especially on precise language, it is fairly generally agreed
that there will be no advance determinations of the capacity which
may be operated, that the primary determining factor will be Third
and Fourth Freedom traffic, that there will be scope for developmen-
tal activity, and that there will be provision for the carriage of Fifth
Freedom traffic. The most difficult remaining problem is that relat-
ing to Fifth Freedom traffic, since a reasonable opportunity to carry
such traffic is essential to the economic operation of long-range inter-
national air lines. On the other hand there is a very real fear on the
part of some nations that the granting of too broad an entitlement to
Fifth Freedom traffic may result in the ruin of their local and regional
air lines. The problem is to find the exact point of balance.
In bilateral negotiations the capacity principles set forth in the
Bermuda Agreement between the United States and the United King-
dom (the so-called "Bermuda principles") have found wide accept-
ance, but there has in the past been considerable resistance to including
them in the multilateral agreement on the ground that they are better
fitted to a bilateral pattern. At Geneva a Working Group composed
8 Although the terms are misnomers, "Third Freedom," "Fourth Freedom,"
and "Fifth Freedom" have become standard in the discussion of traffic rights in
international aviation. In brief, from the viewpoint of United States air lines,
"Third Freedom" refers to the carriage of traffic from the United States to
another country, "Fourth Freedom" refers to the carriage of traffic from another
country to the United States, and "Fifth Freedom" refers to the carriage of
traffic from a second country to a third country.
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of Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States pro-
duced over the first conference weekend a draft capacity article which
represented a clarification of the Bermuda principles and an adaptation
of them to the somewhat differing necessities of a multilateral agree-
ment. After some preliminary discussion, the draft article was referred
to the Drafting Committee for polishing, then brought up fof a second
reading on November 20. It met with considerable minority opposi-
tion, all directed toward emphasizing that local and regional air lines
have a prior right, as against the through operator, to their own local
traffic. Several proposed amendments lost, but by increasingly narrow
margins. At the instance of the United Kingdom a separate article was
inserted to state the general principle that "the development of local
and regional services shall not be unduly prejudiced"; and with no
substantive amendments having been made the paragraph-by-para-
graph discussion of the capacity article was completed.
CONTRACTING-OUT OF THE FIFTH FREEDOM
As soon as this detailed debate on the capacity article had ended,
Canada raised a closely related issue which had been briefly discussed
at an earlier session of the Commission. Any attempt to settle it,
however, had been postponed until later in the conference. Now
Canada renewed insistence that any nation be free to agree with any
other nation that on the routes agreed bilaterally between them neither
nation should exercise Fifth Freedom rights, or that each nation could
exercise only certain Fifth Freedom rights. The United States, the
United Kingdom, and France (among others) maintained that, so
long as route negotiations remained within the control of the individ-
ual nations, there would be no dangerous results. On the other hand,
they felt that to include a provision allowing the elimination of Fifth
Freedom traffic rights from agreed routes would vitiate the value of
the agreement for them.
Discussion continued through Saturday afternoon, November 22,
and a long Sunday morning session, with emphasis throughout that this
was a critical issue. At last a roll-call vote was taken on a Mexican
motion embodying the substance of the Canadian proposal. A counter-
proposal by the United States had been before the Commission, but
the debate had revealed drafting defects in it; and a weary Commission
agreed to vote on what appeared to be the clear-cut issue presented by
the Mexican motion. In the voting, five nations abstained, each of
them stating that it was doing so until it had an opportunity to see the
reworded United States proposal. The vote on the motion was as
follows:
For
Australia Colombia India New Zealand
Brazil Egypt Italy Portugal
Canada Greece Mexico Turkey
Venezuela




Ireland China El Salvador
Netherlands Czechoslovakia Nicaragua





It was this vote and the discussions on capacity and on the general
Fifth Freedom problem which had immediately preceded it which con-
vinced the Commission that general agreement was not possible. A
secondary factor was the pressure of time; for the three weeks origi-
nally scheduled for the conference had already ended, and it was known
that a number of Delegations would have to leave by November 26
and 27. However, the hard fact was that on the root economic issue
there was a clear cleavage between the nations who feel the need for
protecting local and regional air services and those who do not. In
general, the countries which are now the major operators of long-range
international services have not yet succeeded in convincing the other
nations of the world that local operators stand to gain more than they
lose through providing in a multilateral agreement for a reasonable
balance between the two kinds of operation - or else they have failed
to convince the local operators that the kind of agreement which they
have been advocating actually will provide an equitable balance
After the key roll-call vote the Commission concluded its work as
rapidly as possible by drawing up a Final Report explaining the point
which it had reached in its labors, and referring the Report for the
consideration of Member States of ICAO, either individually or at the
Assembly. The most important portion of it is Annex III, which is a
complete draft multilateral agreement, annotated to show the precise
status in which the discussion of the Commission had left each article.
The Commission made no decision as to when further considera-
tion of a multilateral air transport agreement should take place. The
consensus was that serious study of the implications of the failure at
Geneva would be required bef6re any determinations could be made
as to future action. Sorrie statements made to the Commission indi-
cated a feeling that a considerable period of time may have to elapse
before enough additional experience in actual operations has been
gained so that it will be possible to reach agreement on the basic issue.
On the other hand it seemed possible that the discussion at Geneva
might have cleared the air, and upon further study of the much-
widened area of agreement it may appear worthwhile to renew discus-
sion soon. In any event a consideration of the Report of the Geneva
Commission is an item on the Agenda of the Second Assembly of
ICAO, scheduled to meet at Geneva on June 1, 1948, and some de-
cision as to future efforts can be expected to come from that meeting
of the Assembly.
